

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	ER	10 JUL 1985	[Signature]
2	DDCI	10 JUL 1985	[Signature]
3	DCI		[Signature]
4	Please return to PPS-RM 3S09 [Redacted]		
	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
REMARKS:			
Off-Site Conference (27-28 June 1985) Actions			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.			DATE
Director, Intelligence Community Staff			

**TOP SECRET**

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO. [Redacted]

COPY 1 OF

*ER**X Copy**until we received  
our copy from ICS*

Access to this document will be restricted to  
those approved for the following specific activities:

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION**  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

**TOP SECRET**


(Security Classification)

DOC  
DCI

Deputy Director  
Intelligence Community Staff

John  
Bill July 9

2. Pursuant to the  
final of the  
off-site conference  
package, incorporating  
all suggestions



25X1

TOP SECRET

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT: Off-Site Conference (27-28 June 1985) Actions

1. As I discussed in my remarks at the Off-Site, I believe we successfully examined a number of topics which will have significant resource implications in the years ahead. The conference afforded us all an opportunity better to understand the measure of certain of these issues and to appreciate the courses of action that we will have to undertake in order to cope with the challenges presented. I was particularly gratified, as I know you were, that General Galvin was able to join us to provide his perspective and insights on the Latin America region and identify personally for us his need for improved intelligence support in that critical area. I was equally pleased by the excellent briefing from John Gardner of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. I am sure that we all now have a much sharper understanding of both the responsibilities and the opportunities presented to us by the SDI. (U)

2. These off-site conferences provide us the opportunity to examine important issues collectively and, as a result, identify approaches that can be taken towards their resolution. In this regard, I believe that Don Latham's briefing on Defense initiatives in Command Control and Communications was particularly useful and pointed out the importance of a closer working relationship between the Intelligence Community Staff and Defense. I very much appreciate the contributions which each of you made at the conference and continue to believe that it will be to our mutual benefit to continue these types of discussions at periodic intervals during the year. Enclosed are the actions which I believe emerged from the conference discussions. The Director, Intelligence Community Staff, will initiate any follow-up that may be required. I also encourage any comments which you would care to make concerning the conference in general or the specific actions identified. Please direct them to [redacted] (U)

25X1

Sincerely,

William J. Casey

Attachment:

Actions from Off-Site  
Conference [redacted]

25X1  
25X1

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Off-Site Conference (27-28 June 1985) Actions

DISTRIBUTION: [REDACTED]

25X1

- Copy 1 - D/DIA (via DD/DIA--Bissell) (#1 of att)
- Copy 2 - UndSecAF (via DepUndSecAF--Hill) (#2 of att)
- Copy 3 - D/NSA--Odom (#3 of att)
- Copy 4 - DNI (via DDNI [REDACTED]) (#4 of att)
- Copy 5 - D/INR/State (via Tom Thorne) (#5 of att)
- Copy 6 - ACSI/AF--Perroots (#6 of att)
- Copy 7 - Acting ACSI/Army--Shufelt (#7 of att)
- Copy 8 - AD/ID/FBI (O'Malley) (#8 of att)
- Copy 9 - DI/USMC (Breth) (#9 of att)
- Copy 10 - ExDir, CIA (via DDI--Gates) (#10 of att)
- Copy 11 - Chrm, NIC (Gates) (#11 of att)
- Copy 12 - ASD/C<sup>3</sup>I (Latham) (#12 of att)

25X1

Information Copies

- Copy 13 - DCI (#13 of att)
- Copy 14 - DDCI (#14 of att)
- Copy 15 - D/ICS (#15 of att)
- Copy 16 - D/PPS (#16 of att)
- Copy 17 - D/PBS (#17 of att)
- Copy 18 - C/SC (#18 of att)
- Copy 19 - C/COMIREX (#19 of att)
- Copy 20 - C/HC (#20 of att)
- Copy 21 - VC/CIPC (#21 of att)
- Copy 22 - NIO/Terrorism (#22 of att)
- Copy 23 - C/ACIS (#23 of att)
- Copy 24 - [REDACTED] (#24 of att)

25X1

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Off-Site Conference (27-28 June 1985) Actions

DISTRIBUTION: (DCI/ICS 85-4479 w/att. )

25X1

Copy 25 - PPS Chrono (#25 of att)

Copy 26 - PPS Subject (Off-Site) (#26 of att)

Copy 27 - PPS  (#27 of att)

25X1

Copy 28 - IC Registry (#28 of att)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Follow-up Actions from Senior Management Conference

1. A list of actions that emerged from the 27-28 June Senior Management Conference follows. The actions have been grouped in two categories. The first includes matters that for the most part require responses across Community lines. The second includes matters which individual attendees identified as actions they would take within their respective agencies or offices. [ ]

25X1

2. Security. [ ]

25X1

Item: The present climate of security awareness in the Congress presents an opportunity to push initiatives that will materially improve security. Foremost among these is the need to expand polygraph requirements (for access to sensitive sources and methods) to areas which have been exempt, including staffs in both the Executive and Legislative branches.

Action: The Chairman of the Security Committee will develop for DCI review a comprehensive proposal that addresses options for expanding and improving use of the polygraph.

3. HUMINT. [ ]

25X1

Item: There are several steps which can be taken to strengthen HUMINT capabilities and improve coordination of programs. The contributions that can be made by Department of Defense programs make up one area in which significant gains may be made. Another key need is to improve the understanding of Ambassadors and other key officials of national intelligence requirements and encourage better reporting.

25X1

[ ] Also, HUMINT is extremely important for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts [ ] [ ] lessons learned from the past should be applied to help these efforts.

25X1

25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET

Action: The Chairman of the HUMINT Committee will establish a task force to pursue the improvements that can be made in HUMINT.

Action: The Chairman of the HUMINT Committee in collaboration with the Chairman, National Intelligence Council, will initiate an effort to draw together a panel of senior intelligence officials on a periodic basis for the purpose of providing an improved understanding of the Intelligence Community process and the substantive intelligence information required.

4. Counterterrorism.

25X1

Item: A clear need exists to establish a system of priorities for the various terrorism requirements that are levied on the Community, particularly for tactical matters.

Action: The NIO/Counterterrorism, in concert with the chairmen of the appropriate DCI Collection and Requirements Committees, will review existing procedures and priorities related to terrorism requirements, and recommend improvements to the DCI.

Item: SIGINT resources directed against counterterrorism should be reviewed for possible expansion.

Action: The Director of NSA will review counterterrorism SIGINT efforts to determine if additional initiatives can be undertaken.

5. Mobile Missiles.

25X1

Item: The CIPC Mobile Missile Study has been completed, and the best way to take necessary follow-on steps must be identified. Additionally, it is clear that there are a number of potential similarities in methodology and approach that should be shared among mobile missile, space, submarine, and other analysts faced with relocatable targets. Innovative analytical methods may help resolve difficult aspects of the mobile missile issue, and an effort should be made to encourage a cross-Community approach to the problem. In addition to the national agencies, Navy and Air Force (SAC) have particular roles to play.

Action: The CIPC Mobile Missile Panel, working with the arms control community, will review the specific measures which the Intelligence Community could and should take against the various arms control policy options.

25X1

TOP SECRET

6. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). ☐

25X1

Item: An essential aspect of the Intelligence Community/SDIO relationship is that both organizations should ensure that needs, requirements, and opportunities for mutual programs are communicated and understood. There are common themes (e.g., Forward Processing) in SDI, C<sup>3</sup>I, SIGINT, and other Intelligence Community programs. Emphasis must be placed on deriving mutual benefits from these programs.

Action: The Director of the Intelligence Community Staff will act as a primary interface with the SDIO to ensure Community awareness of the directions which SDI is taking and liaison with elements of the Intelligence Community to ensure that each is knowledgeable of SDI research activities and programs.

Item: The SDIO's requirements for information must be identified so that the Intelligence Community may effectively plan its response.

Action: The Director of the Intelligence Community Staff will request that the Director, SDIO prepare a prioritized list of intelligence requirements.

7. Production. ☐

25X1

Item: Intelligence Production activities will be increasingly stressed in the coming years. Manpower growth is likely to be severely constrained, yet production needs are certain to expand. A production capabilities study is required to ensure that the Intelligence Community takes a hard look at production functions in the light of future requirements and priorities.

Action: The Chairman of the Intelligence Producers Council will examine the merits of such a capabilities study and recommend a course of action to the DCI.

8. Requirements. ☐

25X1

Item: Intelligence requirements already outstrip capabilities and this imbalance is expected to grow worse in the future. A review of existing requirements is necessary to develop a basis for assessing new ones and possibly deleting some current ones. It may be necessary to say "no" to some requirements tasked in the future.

Action: The chairmen of the DCI collection committees will review existing collection and exploitation requirements within their disciplines and develop recommendations for the DCI on the proper means of dealing with future requirements.

25X1

TOP SECRET



9. The following list includes actions which individual attendees indicated they would take on within their respective agencies.

25X1  
25X1

- The Deputy Director of DIA stated he would work to tighten the DoD HUMINT program.
- The Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence agreed to pursue improvements in the Navy's HUMINT effort, especially against the terrorist threat.
- The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Assessments and Research (State/INR) noted he would pursue measures to make Foreign Service officers more attentive and responsive to intelligence needs. He also agreed to build more awareness of Intelligence Community requirements into State Department meetings and seminars for Ambassadors and Deputy Chiefs of Mission.

TOP SECRET

25X1